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Using a large sample of earnings press releases by Australian firms, we compare 
multiple attributes of non-GAAP earnings measures with their closest GAAP 
equivalent. We find that, on average, non-GAAP earnings are more persistent, 
smoother, more value-relevant, and have higher predictive power than their closest 
GAAP equivalent. However, the same set of non-GAAP earnings disclosures are also 
less conservative and less timely than their closest GAAP equivalent. The results are 
consistent with non-GAAP earnings measures reflecting a reversal of the trade-off 
between the valuation and stewardship roles of accounting inherent in accounting 
standards and the way they are applied. We also find that differences in several of 
these attributes between GAAP and non-GAAP earnings are more evident in larger 
firms, firms with lower market-to-book ratios, firms with a higher proportion of 
independent directors and firms that report profits rather than losses. Our evidence is 
consistent with the argument that accounting standards impose significant amounts of 
conditional conservatism at some cost to the valuation role of accounting information. 
Non-GAAP earnings measures can therefore be seen as a response to the challenges 
faced by a single GAAP performance measure in satisfying the competing demands of 







External financial reporting is typically argued as having important stewardship and 
valuation roles (IASB 2018). The stewardship role is typically focussed on assessing 
managerial performance, while the valuation role is most commonly linked to the 
identification of future net cash flows.1 However, although managerial performance 
and expected future cash flows are likely positively related to each other, there is also 
widespread recognition that the stewardship and valuation roles may create competing 
demands in terms of desirable attributes of external financial reporting (Kothari et al. 
2010).  For example, it has been argued that conditionally conservative income 
measures facilitate the role of income as an effective measure of managerial 
performance, and serves as an important mechanism for minimizing agency costs 
arising between owners and managers (Watts 2003; Ball and Shivakumar 2005). 
However, such conservatism has a cost, possibly reducing the usefulness of statutory 
income measures in forecasting future performance and hence, of facilitating 
valuation.  
 
Apart from recognising that financial reporting has multiple objectives, the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) has more recently explicitly 
acknowledged the difficulties of a single income measure satisfying these potentially 
competing demands (IASB 2017; 2018b). At the same time, recent years have seen a 
marked rise in the frequency with which firms prominently report non-GAAP 
earnings measures, often described using terms such as “underlying profit”, “cash 
profit”, “recurring earnings” and the like.2 Such terms became popular in the US in 
                                                        
1 Although the IASB removed the stewardship term from the 2010 Conceptual Framework it is 
explicitly recognized in the 2018 version. However, according to the 2018 Conceptual Framework 
(IASB, 2018a), the main objective of financial reporting “is to provide financial information about the 
reporting entity that is useful to existing and potential investors, lenders and other creditors in making 
decisions about providing resources to the entity” (para. 1.2). 
2 There are many terms used to describe non-GAAP definitions of earnings. These include (among 
other terms) cash earnings, underlying profit, recurring profits, pro-forma earnings and normalized 
earnings. For the purpose of our discussion, we define all such metrics as non-GAAP earnings. We use 
the term “street earnings” for alternative performance measures reported by analysts forecast services 
such as I/B/E/S and Thomson Datastream. In this paper we typically restrict our focus to past research 
using actual non-GAAP disclosures, rather than proxy measures such as street earnings. 
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the late 1990s, but were then made subject to relatively stricter regulation (Kolev et al. 
2008). In contrast, this practice has been relatively unregulated in Australia, with 
evidence of steady growth in the frequency with which firms voluntarily disclose 
self-determined measures of financial performance (Coulton et al. 2016).  
 
Following Kothari et al. (2010), we argue that performance measures complying with 
GAAP primarily reflect the stewardship, or control, role of financial reporting. 
Although most research focuses on the private (i.e., contracting) demand for 
conditionally conservative accounting, the calculation of earnings measures 
complying with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) is a highly 
regulated process, subject to the application of accounting standards and the influence 
of auditors. Despite explicit recognition by standard setters of the “value relevance” 
role of financial reporting (e.g., IASB 2018), there is evidence that conditionally 
conservative measurement practices are inherent in accounting standards (Barker and 
McGeachin 2015). 3  Moreover, there are strong incentives for publicly traded 
companies and their auditors to apply GAAP in a conservative manner (Ball and 
Shivakumar 2005).4 However, conditionally conservative accounting may result in 
performance measures which are relatively less useful for valuation purposes than 
otherwise, and there has been an on-going debate about the desirability of 
conservatism as an attribute of accounting (Cooper 2015).  
 
We characterize the supply of non-GAAP earnings measures as a response to 
economic demand for information that is not satisfied solely by GAAP earnings. 
Non-GAAP earnings measures differ from other forms of voluntary disclosure in that 
non-GAAP earnings represent an alternative, though managerially determined, 
                                                        
3 Barker and McGeachin (2015) document the actual requirements of IFRS that lead to conservative 
accounting in practice. They distinguish between unconditional conservatism created by recognition 
rules, and conditional conservatism, which reflects measurement rules. To the extent accounting 
standards are unconditionally conservative, conditional conservatism will not be evident. 
4 Ball and Shivakumar (2005) suggest that conditional conservatism is embedded in GAAP, via rules 
requiring lower of cost or market value, asset impairment rules, restructuring charges and the 
requirement to recognize certain forms of contingent liabilities (to name a few). Ruddock et al. (2006) 
argue that auditing is asymmetric, with a focus on detecting overstatement of results. Hence, the audit 
process also adds to the degree to which GAAP is conditionally conservative. 
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measure of a firm’s financial performance. Most other voluntary disclosures are 
directed at providing supplementary information to assist in interpreting GAAP-based 
financial performance measures (e.g., an airline providing information on passenger 
seat-miles). Non-GAAP earnings thus reflect an “undoing” of GAAP, rather than a 
“clarification”. 
 
We therefore examine the extent to which voluntarily disclosed non-GAAP earnings 
measures demonstrate attributes more consistent with meeting a demand for 
value-relevant information than a traditional stewardship role. We do so via a 
comprehensive comparison of non-GAAP earnings attributes with their closest GAAP 
equivalent. The attributes we examine are earnings persistence, predictability, 
smoothness, value relevance, timeliness, and conservatism (Dechow et al. 2010).5 
While prior studies have examined non-GAAP measures in terms of their 
predictability, information content and valuation role, the persistence, smoothness, 
timeliness and conservatism of non-GAAP earnings have not typically been examined. 
Using a sample derived from applying text-search methods to disclosures made by 
ASX 500 firms from 2000-2014, we directly compare hand-collected non-GAAP 
earnings data from press releases with their closest GAAP equivalent.6 Since firms 
which disclose non-GAAP earnings do so for the same financial period as their GAAP 
equivalent, our comparative tests of the attributes of GAAP versus non-GAAP 
earnings provide a control for financial reporting incentives by holding a firm’s 
business environment and uncertainty constant (Dechow et al. 2010).  
 
Our comparison of non-GAAP earnings attributes with those of their closest GAAP 
equivalent suggests that the voluntary reporting of non-GAAP earnings reflects 
demand for value-relevant measures of financial performance beyond those provided 
by GAAP. The persistence of non-GAAP earnings is significantly higher than that for 
                                                        
5 We do not consider traditional measures of “information content” (i.e., market reaction to earnings 
announcements) due to the “errors in variables” problem caused by a mismatch between the definition 
of realized and expected GAAP and non-GAAP earnings (Cohen et al. 2007; Bentley et al. 2018). 
6 For example, we carefully match pre-tax non-GAAP measures with pre-tax GAAP measures, and so 
on. 
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GAAP earnings, and the difference is economically significant, accounting for about 
36% of GAAP earnings persistence. Compared to their closest GAAP equivalent, 
non-GAAP earnings have significantly higher predictive ability for future profitability, 
suggesting that items excluded from the calculation of non-GAAP earnings are largely 
transitory and help improve the ability of current period earnings to predict future 
performance. Our results also show that non-GAAP earnings are smoother and less 
volatile compared to GAAP earnings, which is also consistent with non-GAAP 
earnings including less transitory items. Non-GAAP earnings are also found to be 
more value-relevant, as evidenced by a significantly higher regression coefficient and 
adjusted R-square from a regression of stock prices on book value and earnings.  
 
On the other hand, using a regression of earnings on stock returns in the manner 
suggested by Basu (1997), we demonstrate that non-GAAP earnings display less 
evidence of conditional conservatism. As a result, we also find that non-GAAP 
earnings are generally less timely than their closest GAAP equivalent. This result is 
consistent with the view that accounting standards are conditionally conservative to 
an extent that exceeds the economic demand for this attribute within measures of 
financial performance that are used for forecasting and valuation. Overall, our 
comparison of non-GAAP earnings attributes with their closest GAAP equivalent 
provides strong support for the view that these voluntary disclosures reflect a demand 
for measures of financial performance that are less subject to conditional 
conservatism of the type inherent in GAAP, and which better facilitate the valuation 
role of financial reporting compared to GAAP-based earnings measures.  
 
In additional tests we extend our analysis to compare attributes of GAAP earnings 
between firms that disclose non-GAAP earnings with those of non-disclosing firms. 
We show that GAAP earnings for firms that voluntarily disclose non-GAAP earnings 
are, on average, less persistent, less smooth, but more conditionally conservative than 
GAAP earnings reported by firms that do not voluntarily report non-GAAP earnings. 
These results, while subject to the myriad uncontrolled differences between firms that 
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disclose non-GAAP measures and those that do not, increase our confidence that 
voluntary disclosure of non-GAAP earnings reflects demand for more value relevant 
measures of financial performance than those produced by applying GAAP.7  
 
Finally, we investigate whether the differences we identify between the attributes of 
GAAP and non-GAAP earnings are in turn influenced by differences in firm size, the 
market-to-book ratio, industry-level propensity of non-GAAP disclosures, board 
independence and whether the GAAP result is a profit or loss. Existing evidence on 
the association between these variables and the various measures of earnings quality 
we examine is mixed (Dechow et al. 2010). Accordingly, it is unclear whether and 
how these variables would affect attributes of voluntarily disclosed non-GAAP figures. 
We find that differences between GAAP and non-GAAP earnings attributes are 
generally more evident in large firms, firms with lower market-to-book ratios, firms 
that report a GAAP profit rather than a loss, and in firms with relatively more 
independent boards. However differences in GAAP and non-GAAP attributes are 
generally similar regardless of the industry-propensity to disclose non-GAAP 
earnings. 
 
Our paper makes several important contributions. First, to our knowledge, no prior 
research compares a broad set of attributes for non-GAAP performance measures with 
their closest GAAP equivalent, namely persistence, smoothness, value-relevance, 
timeliness and conservatism. Our results thus yield novel evidence on how the 
voluntary disclosure of non-GAAP measures of financial performance reflects a 
trade-off among various attributes of financial reporting, the merits of which continue 
to be debated (Kothari et al. 2010). By using actual disclosures of non-GAAP 
earnings figures collected from press releases and comparing these figures to their 
closest non-GAAP equivalent, we are able to provide evidence on the extent to which 
managers engage in voluntary disclosure directed at reversing the extent of 
                                                        
7 We also confirm that our results are not driven by the year of initial non-GAAP disclosure or its 
cessation. 
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conditional conservatism and improving the extent to which summary measures of 
financial performance are value relevant or useful for forecasting. Extensive debate 
has occurred over the relative merit of these attributes as fundamental objectives for 
guiding the development of accounting standards, so directly observing how 
voluntary measures compare with statutory measures absent any firm-specific or 
time-specific differences has the potential to inform standard setters and regulators in 
setting reporting frameworks and developing standards for the reporting of financial 
performance. 
 
Managers “undoing” of mandated GAAP to create non-GAAP performance measures 
brings into question the extent to which such disclosure may be self-serving, rather 
than incrementally informative. Prior empirical research offers at least some evidence 
that non-GAAP disclosures are opportunistic, as evidenced by managers using these 
measures to meet earnings benchmarks (Bhattacharya et al. 2004; Black and 
Christensen 2009; Heflin and Hsu 2008, Black et al. 2017a) or otherwise influence 
investor perceptions (Guillamon-Saorin et al. 2017). Similar sentiment has been 
expressed by accounting standard setters, who not surprisingly have recognized the 
increasing frequency of non-GAAP earnings disclosures as a challenge (Hoogervorst 
2015; IASB 2017). However, there is also considerable evidence that suggests 
non-GAAP earnings are useful to investors (Bhattacharya et al. 2003; Doyle et al. 
2003; Lougee and Marquardt 2004; Choi et al. 2007).  
 
Second, our focus on multiple attributes is in contrast to prior studies, which typically 
examine one (or a small number) of attributes consistent with either an “informative 
disclosure” or “self-serving” explanation for non-GAAP disclosure. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, there is a strong correlation between the individual attribute (or context) 
examined and the conclusion reached. 8  For example, published studies which 
consider whether non-GAAP earnings disclosures are motivated by earnings and/or 
impression management concerns invariably conclude that they are. However, those 
                                                        
8 For reviews of this literature, see Black et al. (2018) and Coulton et al. (2016). 
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which solely consider the value-relevance of accounting data invariably conclude that 
non-GAAP disclosures are relatively useful. Such divergent conclusions suggest these 
studies are unlikely to distinguish between the informative and strategic motives as 
explanations for disclosure of non-GAAP earnings measures. Their ability to assist 
standard setters and regulators to identify appropriate actions is therefore limited.  
 
Third, our results highlight an important source of demand for less, rather than more 
conditional conservatism relative to that contained in GAAP earnings. Ball and 
Shivakumar (2005) argue that, relative to private firms, stakeholders in publicly 
traded firms demand more conditional conservatism. However, Heflin et al. (2015) 
show that analysts typically forecast earnings measures which are less conditionally 
conservative, but more value relevant, than GAAP earnings. Our results are consistent 
with those of Heflin et al., as voluntarily disclosed non-GAAP earnings similarly 
appear to undo some degree of conditional conservatism and increase attributes 
associated with value relevance in much the same way as sell-side analysts. Given 
analysts’ preference for value relevant earnings that are more predictable and 
persistent, they likely represent one source of economic demand for non-GAAP 
earnings disclosures. Our results are also consistent with the claim by Barker and 
McGeachin (2015) that IFRS standards embed conditional conservatism, such that 
GAAP measures of performance are more consistent with the stewardship role of 
accounting than the valuation role, despite standard setters’ suggestions to the 
contrary. 
 
Finally, to the extent that a trade-off between value relevance and conditional 
conservatism is evidenced by voluntary disclosure of non-GAAP earnings, our results 
provide empirical support for the argument that a single measure of earnings is 
unlikely to satisfy the competing demands for measures of financial performance that 
serve the valuation role as well as the traditional stewardship role (Kothari et al. 2010). 
Explicit recognition by standard setters of this possibility has important implications 
for the development of regulations regarding the reporting of key performance 
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measures, as well as the extent to which disaggregation of financial performance 
should be encouraged or even required. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief review 
of the non-GAAP literature, the prevailing institutional setting we examine, and the 
commonly used measures of earnings quality that we compare between non-GAAP 
earnings disclosures and their closest GAAP equivalent. Research design including 
sample construction, descriptive statistics, and correlation analysis are discussed in 
Section 3. Section 4 presents the results for tests of different aspects of earnings 
quality, as well as comparing these metrics between firms voluntarily disclosing 
non-GAAP measures and those that do not. Section 5 outlines several additional tests, 
including analysis of the sensitivity of our results to a number of firm-specific factors. 




2.1 Prior evidence 
As noted in section 1, there is considerable debate about whether the voluntary 
disclosure of non-GAAP earnings metrics primarily reflects a desire to provide useful 
disclosure beyond that available under GAAP, or whether such disclosure is primarily 
self-serving. Prior evidence offers support for both views, although it is noteworthy 
that prior studies do not typically try to address any form of trade-off, but rather focus 
on a single attribute.9  
 
Several studies suggest that non-GAAP earnings disclosures are informative. For 
example, Bhattacharya et al. (2003) study a large sample of actual non-GAAP press 
releases for US firms, and document that, compared to street earnings, 
                                                        
9 Our brief discussion of prior research is not intended to be comprehensive, but rather illustrative of 
the limitation arising from focusing on a single earnings attribute (i.e., measure of earnings quality). 
We also disregard studies that do not examine actual non-GAAP disclosures, but instead rely on 
substitutes such as analysts’ forecasts. Black et al. (2018) and Coulton et al. (2016) both provide 
detailed summaries of prior research.  
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non-GAAP-based forecast errors are more highly correlated with abnormal returns 
around earnings announcement dates and forecast revisions. Brown and Sivakumar 
(2003) demonstrate that non-GAAP earnings reported by US firms contain value 
relevant information beyond that of operating earnings. Choi et al. (2007) use a 
sample of non-GAAP disclosures made by UK firms, and show that items excluded 
from earnings by management are not value relevant. In addition, items included in 
voluntarily disclosed non-GAAP earnings but excluded from street earnings (as 
reported by Thomson Datastream) are incrementally value relevant, consistent with 
voluntary disclosure to adjust not only GAAP earnings, but also street earnings. 
 
Of course, it is also not surprising that concerns are raised as to whether the voluntary 
disclosure of non-GAAP earnings measures is simply self-serving behaviour 
(Hoogervorst 2015). The deliberate “management” of GAAP earnings is constrained 
to some extent by the underlying accounting relation, whereby accruals reverse in 
future periods. In addition, accrual-based earnings management is subject to the 
scrutiny of auditors and regulators. Hence, the voluntary disclosure of non-GAAP 
earnings may be an attempt to misrepresent (i.e., overstate) financial performance. 
 
Some support for the self-serving perspective arises from evidence that a majority of 
voluntarily disclosed non-GAAP earnings measures exceed GAAP earnings for the 
same period, and a higher percentage of non-GAAP earnings also exceed analysts’ 
forecasts (Bhattacharya et al. 2003; Bhattacharya et al. 2004; Coulton et al. 2016). 
Black and Christensen (2009) document that non-GAAP earnings reported by US 
firms frequently exclude items that are not “one-off” in nature (i.e., research and 
development expenses, depreciation and amortization, and share-based compensation 
expenses). Moreover, these adjustments are significantly associated with firms’ ability 
to achieve strategic earnings benchmarks that they would otherwise have missed 
based on GAAP earnings.  
 
Brown et al. (2012) show that US firms are more likely to disclose a non-GAAP 
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earnings measure when investor sentiment is high, thereby further reinforcing these 
positive perceptions. Guillamon-Saorin et al. (2017) reach a similar conclusion. They 
show that exclusions from non-GAAP earnings voluntarily disclosed by European 
firms are more persistent when a broader measure of impression management is also 
high. Evidence of quasi-earnings management via voluntarily disclosed non-GAAP 
earnings is provided by Black et al. (2017), who show that the probability of 
disclosing non-GAAP earnings is increasing with the extent to which managers are 
unable to meet earnings expectations via accrual-based and transaction-based methods 
of earnings management. 
 
Overall, we simply observe that published research examining either the informative 
or self-serving rationales for voluntary disclosure of non-GAAP earnings typically 
rejects the null hypothesis (i.e., the studies report evidence consistent with the 
alternative hypothesis, which is either self-serving or informative disclosure). 
Conclusions regarding the costs or benefits of such disclosure that seemingly depend 
on whether the researcher examines a setting focussed on possibly self-serving 
behaviour (e.g., increased rates of benchmark beating) or informative disclosure (e.g., 
value relevance measures). Ideally, researchers would test competing hypotheses 
against one another. However, the existing measures used to identify either 
self-serving or informative disclosure rationales do not lend themselves to identifying 
any “net” trade-off. Hence, we take a different approach to prior studies, and compare 
non-GAAP earnings with their closest GAAP equivalent across several different 
dimensions of earnings quality. 
 
2.2 Our approach 
We examine a wide range of attributes that are often argued to reflect earnings quality 
(Dechow et al. 2010). Our focus is voluntary disclosures of non-GAAP earnings by 
Australian firms found in press releases outlining annual financial results. Non-GAAP 
disclosures in Australia are largely unregulated, other than being subject to the general 
principles of continuous disclosure that apply to all ASX-listed firms (Brown et al. 
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1999). While the regulator issued guidance in 2011 (ASIC 2011), this was largely 
restricted to ensuring that a sufficient reconciliation was provided between the 
non-GAAP measure and the GAAP measure of financial performance.10  
 
According to the IASB Conceptual Framework (IASB, 2018), the main objective of 
financial reporting “is to provide financial information about the reporting entity that 
is useful to existing and potential investors, lenders and other creditors in making 
decisions about providing resources to the entity” (para. 1.2). Within this objective 
there is explicit recognition of both the value relevance and stewardship roles. 
However, as Kothari et al. (2010) argue, there are likely inevitable conflicts between 
these roles, and “desirable” attributes of financial reporting measures such as earnings 
are therefore dependent on what is defined as the pre-eminent role. Relatedly, Dechow 
et al. (2010) recognize that the construct “earnings quality” is highly contextual, 
arguing that “higher quality earnings provide more information about the features of a 
firm’s financial performance that are relevant to a specific decision made by a specific 
decision-maker” (emphasis added).  
 
We therefore consider multiple attributes of non-GAAP earnings and compare each of 
these in turn with the same set of attributes displayed by the closest equivalent GAAP 
measure. This approach has the advantage of comparing two measures for the same 
set of firm-years, so the underlying business and economic environment is identical. 
Hence, any differences we observe between GAAP and non-GAAP earnings are a 
reflection of how those earnings figures are calculated (i.e., their properties), and are 
not due to different sets of business conditions or economic factors. Below we discuss 
the different attributes (i.e., aspects of earnings quality) that we examine.  
 
2.2.1 Earnings persistence  
Earnings persistence is widely used as a measure of earnings quality as it captures 
                                                        
10 Coulton et al. (2016) provide a detailed overview of the history of non-GAAP disclosures by 
Australian firms, as well as the regulatory environment. 
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earnings sustainability (Francis et al. 2004). Persistent earnings are considered to be 
more “sustainable” if they are recurring and useful as inputs into valuation models 
(e.g., Penman and Zhang 2002). Earnings persistence is also found to be positively 
associated with the stock price response to earnings news (Kormendi and Lipe 1987; 
Collins and Kothari 1989; Easton and Zmijewski 1989). However, to our knowledge, 
there is little research directly comparing the persistence of GAAP versus non-GAAP 
earnings. 
 
Following previous research (e.g, Lev 1983; Ali and Zarowin 1992; Francis et al. 
2004), we measure earnings persistence as the slope coefficient estimate, α2, from a 
first-order autoregressive model (AR1) for annual split-adjusted earnings: 
 
Earnt+1 = α0 + α2Earnt + υt+1  (1) 
 
where Earn is either GAAP earnings per share (GaapEarn), calculated as GAAP 
earnings divided by the number of total shares outstanding for firm i at time t, or 
non-GAAP earnings per share (NGEarn), calculated as the non-GAAP earnings 
metric collected from the earnings press release divided by the number of total shares 
outstanding for firm i at time t.  
 
2.2.2 Earnings predictability  
Earnings predictability is high when past earnings are reasonably good estimates of 
current earnings (Lipe 1990). In their survey of more than 400 US executives, 
Graham et al. (2005) find that earnings predictability is a primary concern among 
CFOs. Likewise, sell-side analysts are believed to prefer earnings measures that are 
relatively more predictable. Some evidence of the advantage non-GAAP earnings has 
for prediction purposes is offered by Lougee and Marquardt (2004). They find mixed 
evidence, in that current period non-GAAP earnings have no predictive power for 
future GAAP earnings, but have marginally significant predictive ability for future 
non-GAAP earnings.  
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Following Lougee and Marquardt (2004), our measure of earnings predictability is 
derived from regressing year-ahead GAAP or non-GAAP earnings on current year 
GAAP and non-GAAP earnings, as follows: 
 
Earni, t+1= α0,i+ α1,iGaapEarni,t+ α2,iNGEarni,t +εi,t  (2) 
 
where Earn is either GAAP earnings per share (GaapEarn) or non-GAAP earnings 
per share (NGEarn). A significant coefficient on non-GAAP earnings indicates that 
non-GAAP earnings have predictive ability for future profitability. 
 
2.2.3 Earnings smoothness  
Earnings smoothness is positively associated with earnings quality, subject to the 
assumption that managers use their private information about future profitability to 
smooth out transitory variations and thereby achieve a more representative and useful 
earnings figure (Francis et al. 2004). However, several cross-country studies 
document evidence that earnings smoothness is associated with predicted 
determinants of low earnings quality such as low-quality country GAAP, less 
enforcement, or poor shareholder rights (Leuz et al. 2003; Lang et al. 2006; Francis 
and Wang 2008). Smoothness measures are based on the volatility of earnings relative 
to some benchmark, such as cash flows (Leuz et al. 2003; Francis et al. 2004).  
 
Following Francis et al. (2004), we define smoothness as a ratio: 
 
Earnings smoothnessi,t=σ(GaapEarni,t)/σ(NGEarni,t)  (3) 
 
where Earnings smoothnessi,t is the ratio of firm i’s standard deviation of GAAP 
earnings divided by beginning total assets, to its standard deviation of non-GAAP 
earnings divided by beginning total assets. A ratio of earnings smoothness higher than 
one indicates that non-GAAP earnings are less volatile than GAAP earnings. 
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2.2.4 Value relevance  
Value relevance is often measured as the ability of earnings to explain variation in 
stock prices or returns (Francis et al. 2004). Entwistle et al. (2010) find that 
non-GAAP earnings disclosed by large US firms are significantly more value relevant 
than street earnings from I/B/E/S, which in turn are more value relevant than GAAP 
earnings. Venter et al. (2014) use price-level regressions based on the Ohlson (1995) 
model to examine the incremental and relative value relevance of mandatory 
non-GAAP earnings disclosures reported by South African firms. They find that 
mandatorily reported non-GAAP earnings have higher value relevance than 
comparable GAAP earnings.11 
 
We follow Collins et al. (1997) and conduct our tests based on the framework 
developed by Ohlson (1995), where firm value is a function of book value of equity 
and accounting earnings:  
 
Pricei,t= α0,i+β1Bookvali,t+ β2Earni,t + εi,t  (4)  
 
where Pricei,t is the fiscal year-end closing price, adjusted for stock splits and stock 
dividends for firm i at time t; Bookvali,t is common equity per share for firm i at time t; 
Earni,t is either GAAP earnings per share (GaapEarn) or non-GAAP earnings per 
share (NGEarn). The estimation with higher explanatory power (adjusted R2) is 
considered to be more value relevant. In addition, we consider the difference in 
coefficient values, given that equation (4) is estimated for the same set of firm-years.  
 
2.2.5 Timeliness and conditional conservatism  
The timeliness of earnings is a reflection of the extent to which economic news is 
contemporaneously reflected in earnings, rather than with a lag. Prior research 
                                                        
11 Because the disclosure of “headline earnings” is mandatory for their sample, the results of Venter et 
al. (2014) may not extend to settings where non-GAAP disclosure is voluntary. 
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generally estimates timeliness by examining the explanatory power from a “reverse 
regression” (i.e., regressing earnings on a measure of contemporaneous economic 
news, most obviously the stock return) (Ball et al. 2000; Bushman et al. 2004). 
Conditional conservatism is therefore the asymmetric timeliness with which earnings 
responds to negative, as distinct from positive economic news (Basu 1997; Ball and 
Shivakumar 2005). While we are not aware of any examination of the extent to which 
non-GAAP earnings display relatively less (or more) conditional conservatism than 
GAAP earnings, the evidence reported by Heflin et al. (2015) suggests that sell-side 
analysts “undo” some GAAP requirements in forecasting street earnings, resulting in 
these forecasts being less conditionally conservative than GAAP.  
 
To compare the timeliness and conservatism of non-GAAP earnings with the closest 
GAAP equivalent, we follow Basu (1997) and estimate the following equation: 
 
EARNj,t= α0,j+ α1,jNEGj,t+ β1,jRETj,t++ β2,jNEGj,t* RETj,t+ςj,t (5) 
 
where RETj,t is firm j’s 12-month return ending three months after the end of fiscal 
year t; NEGj,t is equal to one if RETj,t is negative and 0 otherwise; and EARNj,t is 
GAAP earnings per share (GaapEarn) or non-GAAP earnings per share (NGEarn). 
We compare the adjusted R-squares from estimates using non-GAAP and GAAP 
earnings respectively to assess differences in timeliness. The regression coefficient β2 
provides a measure of conditional conservatism. A higher value of β2 indicates greater 
conservatism.  
 
3. Research design 
 
3.1. Sample 
Voluntary disclosures of non-GAAP earnings data are identified from earnings 
announcements by ASX 500 firms from 2000 to 2014. Using text search technology 
available from SIRCA, we are able to identify all instances within full-year profit 
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announcements where a non-GAAP earnings measure was reported. A comprehensive 
dictionary of terms commonly used to describe non-GAAP earnings such as “cash 
earnings”, “core earnings”, “underlying earnings” and “normalized profit” were used 
in the initial search stage. 12  The final sample consists of 11,648 firm-year 
observations for the period of 2000-2014. Given the variation in disclosed non-GAAP 
earnings (including whether they are pre or post-tax), we then hand collect the GAAP 
measure which most closely corresponds to the non-GAAP measure. 13  This 
procedure increases our confidence that we are comparing like-for-like figures, which 
is an important assumption for the “horse race” approach we use.  
 
We use the Morningstar DatAnalysis Database to extract other accounting 
information. Following prior literature, we exclude firm-years with (1) negative total 
assets; (2) negative book value of equity; (3) negative or missing sales revenue; and (4) 
extreme values of return-on-equity or net profit margin higher or equal to 100%. To 
mitigate the undue influence of outliers, we winsorise the top and bottom one 
percentile of key variables used in the regression analysis.14 
 
3.2 Descriptive statistics 
Panel A of Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for our data. The average firm has a 
price of $2.69 per share and a book value of equity per share of $1.27. The mean 
dollar value per share of GAAP earnings is $0.27, while the mean dollar value per 
share of non-GAAP earnings is $0.32. The median value of non-GAAP earnings is 
also higher than for GAAP earnings ($0.17 vs. $0.14). This indicates that on average 
our sample firms report higher non-GAAP earnings than GAAP earnings.15  
                                                        
12 In the initial stages of identifying non-GAAP earnings disclosures, two research assistants (to 
cross-check) and one senior researcher examined each case to ensure that an appropriate match 
occurred with the closest GAAP equivalent. Further details on the data collection process are outlined 
in Coulton et al. (2016). 
13 Our “matching” of GAAP and non-GAAP is also verified by reference to firms’ own reconciliation 
of non-GAAP and GAAP. 
14 Our results remain quantitatively similar if we trim the top and bottom percentiles of key variables 
or keep them in the analysis. 
15 As expected, we also find that GAAP earnings and non-GAAP earnings are highly correlated, with a 
significant Person (Spearman) correlation coefficient of 0.824 (0.834). 
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Panel B reports the frequency of non-GAAP disclosures across different industries. 
Industries are classified based on the SIRCA industry classification codes. Australian 
companies in financial industries (e.g., Banks and Insurance) are found to be most 
likely to present non-GAAP information, followed by companies in Utilities (50%), 
Media (49%), Food and Staples Retailing (49%) and Materials excluding Metals and 
Mining (49%). On the other hand, ASX 500 companies in Pharmaceuticals and 
Biotechnology (9%), Metals and Mining (10%), Technology, Hardware and 
Equipment (15%) and Energy (19%) are least likely to disclose non-GAAP earnings. 
Non-GAAP exclusions are predominately positive in all industries except Automobile 
and Components, further suggesting that non-GAAP earnings typically exceed their 
closest GAAP equivalent. Further analysis (untabulated) shows that non-GAAP 
exclusions decrease by $0.012 per share for firms from “frequent disclosing” 
industries, accounting for a reduction of 21% compared to the average non-GAAP 
exclusions ($0.058 per share).  
 




4.1. The quality of GAAP vs. non-GAAP earnings 
Table 2 reports our comparison of non-GAAP earnings disclosures with their closest 
GAAP equivalent for each individual attribute (i.e., measures of earnings quality). 
These results reflect time-series averages derived from annual estimations, which also 
allow us to estimate any time-trend in each attribute for GAAP earnings or 
non-GAAP earnings individually, as well as in the differences between the two 
measures of earnings. We report coefficient values with probability levels in 
parentheses. 
 
Panel A of Table 2 reports our tests of earnings persistence, using a regression of 
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either GAAP or non-GAAP earnings on their respective lagged values (equation (1)). 
The results show that, on average, non-GAAP earnings are significantly more 
persistent than GAAP earnings (0.937 vs. 0.698). The difference in persistence 
between GAAP and non-GAAP earnings (0.240) is economically large, accounting 
for around 36% of GAAP earnings persistence. Overall, it appears that non-GAAP 
earnings are substantially more persistent than their closest GAAP equivalent. 
 
Tests of predictability (equation (2)) are reported in Panel B of Table 2, derived from 
regressing future profitability (either GAAP or non-GAAP earnings) on both current 
period GAAP earnings and non-GAAP earnings (Lougee and Marquardt 2004). The 
estimation of equation (2) indicates that GAAP and non-GAAP earnings both have 
predictive ability for future GAAP earnings (coefficient = 0.171, p-value = 0.002 for 
GAAP earnings; coefficient = 0.788, p-value = 0.000 for non-GAAP earnings). 
Notably though, non-GAAP earnings measures have higher predictive ability than 
GAAP earnings (0.788 vs. 0.171), indicating that the exclusion of certain items from 
GAAP earnings to construct non-GAAP earnings improves the ability of current 
period earnings to predict future profitability. In terms of predicting future non-GAAP 
earnings, the coefficient on non-GAAP earnings is found to be positive and significant, 
while the coefficients on GAAP earnings are insignificant in most years, and on 
average are not significantly different from zero. When we focus on the adjusted 
R-square as an indicator of predictability, it is evident that non-GAAP earnings are 
significantly more predictable overall than earnings reported in compliance with 
GAAP. Overall, our results in Panels A and B of Table 2 support the view that, relative 
to their closest GAAP equivalent, non-GAAP earnings are more persistent and more 
predictable.  
 
Our comparison of the smoothness of non-GAAP earnings relative to their closest 
GAAP equivalent (equation (3)) is reported in Panel C of Table 2. The results show 
that, on average, non-GAAP earnings are significantly smoother than GAAP earnings. 
This decrease in volatility compared to GAAP earnings is consistent with non-GAAP 
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earnings containing less transitory items. However, we also observe a significant time 
trend, whereby the relative smoothness of non-GAAP earnings declines over the 
period we examine. Further examination suggests that this reflects some increase in 
the volatility of non-GAAP earnings, rather than any decline in the volatility of 
earnings reported in compliance with GAAP. 
 
In Panel D of Table 2 we report the results from our tests of value relevance (equation 
(4)). This entails regressing price on both book value and earnings, where earnings is 
either the voluntarily disclosed non-GAAP measure or its closest GAAP equivalent. 
Turning first to GAAP earnings, we find evidence of value relevance with a positive 
and significant average coefficient of 5.707. However, when GAAP earnings are 
replaced by non-GAAP earnings, the average coefficient on non-GAAP earnings is 
11.677, which is also significantly higher than that for GAAP earnings. Although the 
stronger result for non-GAAP earnings may partially reflect a decreased role for book 
value (the book value coefficient declines from 1.378 to 0.619), we also observe a 
significant increase in the model adjusted R-square when non-GAAP earnings are 
used in place of GAAP earnings (0.834 vs. 0.731). This result further supports the 
view that the value relevance of non-GAAP earnings exceeds that for GAAP earnings. 
It is also of interest to observe that the difference in explanatory power shows 
evidence of having increased over time, which is consistent with some divergence in 
earnings properties important to the stewardship and value relevance roles.  
 
Estimations of timeliness and conservatism are reported in Panel E of Table 2. 
Turning first to timeliness, we find the adjusted R-square from estimating equation (5) 
using GAAP earnings is significantly higher compared to estimations using 
non-GAAP earnings (0.098 vs. 0.066), suggesting that GAAP earnings are more 
timely than non-GAAP earnings. We also observe a significant decline over time in 
the timeliness of non-GAAP earnings, with a negative and significant time trend of 
-0.005 (p-value = 0.027). In contrast, there is no significant decline over time in the 
timeliness of GAAP earnings.  
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When we focus on our measure of conservatism, the results in Panel E of Table 2 
provide strong evidence consistent with non-GAAP earnings being less conditionally 
conservative than their closest GAAP equivalent. For GAAP earnings, the coefficient 
associated with stock returns restricted only to negative values (i.e., the incremental 
responsiveness to a measure of bad economic news, β2) is 0.808, which is higher than 
that for non-GAAP earnings (0.585). The difference, while economically large, is only 
marginally statistically significant (p-value = 0.129). However, this reflects at least in 
part a decline over time in the extent to which non-GAAP earnings are less 
conditionally conservative, as evidenced by the significant negative coefficient from a 
simple time trend regression of the annual differences. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Overall, we characterize the results presented in Table 2 as being supportive of the 
argument that voluntarily disclosed non-GAAP earnings are more useful for 
forecasting and valuation than their closest GAAP equivalent. However, the results 
presented in Table 2 are based on time-series averages from annual regressions, while 
the p-values and statistics are calculated using the time-series coefficients and 
adjusted R-squares in the Fama-MacBeth (1973) fashion. An alternative approach is 
to use a pooled regression, and include industry and year dummies to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity. The results are presented in Table 3. Consistent with those 
reported in Table 2, the results support the argument that non-GAAP earnings reported 
by Australian firms are more persistent and smoother, and have higher predictive 
power over future underlying performance, suggesting that non-GAAP earnings have 
higher quality than GAAP earnings. In addition, the results suggest that the timeliness 
and conservatism of non-GAAP earnings are significantly lower than those for GAAP 
earnings. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
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4.2 Disclosers versus non-disclosers 
Inferences drawn from our primary tests reported in Tables 2 and 3 are based solely 
on a comparison of non-GAAP earnings and their closest GAAP equivalent. While the 
setting facilitates a simple “horse race” design (e.g., which earnings measure “wins” 
for a given attribute), it is limited to those firms that voluntarily disclose non-GAAP 
earnings. The results could also be due in part to differences in the way GAAP is 
applied to firms disclosing non-GAAP earnings compared to non-disclosers. The 
existence of such differences may also add weight to the argument that voluntary 
disclosure of non-GAAP earnings is motivated by a desire to provide a measure of 
earnings that is more value relevant and less conditionally conservative. If so, we 
would expect that firms disclosing non-GAAP earnings would demonstrate less 
persistent or value-relevant, but more timely and conservative GAAP earnings than 
companies without non-GAAP disclosures.  
 
We therefore repeat the analyses reported in Table 3 for all ASX 500 firms over the 
period 2000-2014, and include an indicator variable, NG_dummy, which takes a value 
of one if firms voluntarily disclose non-GAAP information, and zero otherwise. The 
results are provided in Table 4. They suggest that GAAP earnings in companies with 
voluntary non-GAAP disclosures are found to be less persistent, less smooth but more 
conservative. While these results are descriptive only, and do not control in any way 
for differences between disclosing and non-disclosing firm-years, we view them as 
consistent with the view that GAAP earnings, to a large extent, reflect the stewardship 
role and the supply of non-GAAP earnings is a response to economic demand for 
information that is not satisfied by GAAP earnings measures. In addition, the results 
are in sharp contrast to the findings for non-GAAP earnings discussed previously, 
suggesting that our evidence that non-GAAP earnings are more persistent, predictable 
and value-relevant, but less timely and less conservative is not attributable to the 
differential attributes of GAAP earnings between non-GAAP disclosing firms and 
non-disclosing firms.  
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[Table 4 about here] 
 
5. Additional Analysis 
 
5.1 Cross-sectional variation in earnings quality differences 
The above analyses suggest substantial differences between the attributes of GAAP 
and non-GAAP earnings. In this section, we investigate whether such differences vary 
across several firm-specific characteristics. While we regard this evidence as 
exploratory, we consider the effect of differences in firm size, the market-to-book 
ratio, industry-level propensity of non-GAAP disclosures, accounting loss versus 
profit, and board independence. As summarized in Dechow et al. (2010), evidence on 
the association between these variables and different indicators of earnings quality is 
quite mixed. Accordingly, it is unclear whether and how these variables would affect 
differences in the attributes of non-GAAP and GAAP earnings that we document.  
 
Table 5 repeats the analysis of Table 3, but separates observations into those with 
above or below median firm size, measured as equity market capitalization. Firm size 
can be negatively associated with earnings quality because larger firms would make 
income-deceasing accounting method choices in response to greater regulatory 
scrutiny (Watts and Zimmerman 1986). On the other hand, it is suggested that size 
and earnings quality is positively related because small firms are more likely to have 
internal control deficiencies (Ball and Foster 1982; Doyle et al. 2007). Of course, one 
difficulty with this reasoning is that earnings quality has several dimensions, and 
these are also context specific. Our results indicate that the differences between 
attributes of GAAP and non-GAAP earnings are more evident in large firms. 
Compared to GAAP earnings, non-GAAP figures in large firms tend to be more 
persistent, predictive, and value-relevant and smoother, but have a lower degree of 
conservatism. These patterns are not as strong when analysis is restricted to 
firm-years with below median size. 
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[Table 5 about here] 
 
Table 6 repeats the analysis in Table 3, but with separate estimates for firms with 
above and below median values of the market-to-book ratio. The market-to-book ratio 
is often used as a measure of relative firm valuation. Firms with high market-to-book 
ratio are considered as those with relatively high valuations, thereby facing higher 
pressure from capital market participants. Accordingly, firms with higher 
market-to-book ratios are more likely to voluntarily disclose favourable information 
(e.g., non-GAAP numbers) to meet or beat market expectation, even though such 
information may not be of high quality. We generally find that the differences between 
non-GAAP earnings and GAAP earnings reported in Table 3 are prevalent for both 
higher and lower market-to-book firms.  
  
[Table 6 about here] 
 
It is evident from Table 1 (Panel B) that the propensity to provide a non-GAAP 
earnings measure varies across industries. It is possible that as more firms voluntarily 
disclose non-GAAP figures within an industry, the more pressure their industry peers 
face to similarly provide non-GAAP disclosures. To the extent non-GAAP disclosure 
is mimicking industry peers, we expect that observable differences in attributes 
between GAAP and non-GAAP earnings will be attenuated (i.e., there would be a bias 
against finding the type of differences reported in Tables 2 and 3). Nevertheless, we 
consider possible industry-specific differences in how attributes of non-GAAP 
earnings differ from GAAP. We classify firm-years into two groups based on the 
industry-level disclosure propensity of non-GAAP earnings, where the industry 
propensity of non-GAAP disclosures is measured as the percentage of firms 
voluntarily disclosing non-GAAP figures in each of the 25 SIRCA industries. The 
results in Table 7 suggest that the differences documented in Table 3 are evident 
across industry groups, regardless of whether there is a relatively high or low 
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propensity to disclose non-GAAP earnings.  
 
[Table 7 about here] 
 
Over the past several decades, the proportion of Australian firms reporting negative 
income has increased significantly (Balkrishna et al. 2007). Attributes of accounting 
information for loss firms are found to be substantially different from profitable firms. 
For example, Hayn (1995) shows that, for loss firms, accounting earnings are less 
informative about firms’ future prospects. Barth et al. (2018) show that accounting 
earnings has little relevance for firms reporting a financial loss. Givoly and Hayn 
(2000) and Balkrishna et al. (2007) demonstrate that the increased proportion of listed 
firms reporting a loss is consistent with an increased degree of accounting 
conservatism among US and Australian listed firms respectively. Hence, GAAP 
earnings may become less useful in predicting future performance but more 
conservative among firms reporting negative GAAP earnings. In addition, our 
previous findings suggest that non-GAAP earnings are generally more persistent, 
predictable and value relevant, but are less conservative and less timely compared to 
their closest GAAP equivalent. Since the difference between GAAP and non-GAAP 
earnings for profitable and loss firms depends on the incremental information 
contained in non-GAAP earnings, we expect to observe that the difference between 
GAAP and non-GAAP earnings is more significant among loss firms in terms of the 
persistence and predictability of earnings, but less significant in terms of 
conservatism.  
 
Table 8 repeats the analysis in Table 3, but with separate estimates for firms reporting 
a positive GAAP profit after tax and those making a loss. Consistent with Barth et al. 
(2018) and Hayn (1995), we find that disclosed earnings (either GAAP or non-GAAP 
earnings) tend to be less predictive and useful for firms reporting a loss. However, we 
find that the differences between non-GAAP earnings and GAAP earnings in terms of 
persistence, predictability and relevance are only evident among profitable firms. 
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Such differences become insignificant in loss-making firms. This finding indicates 
that both GAAP and non-GAAP earnings tend to be less useful for firms reporting a 
financial loss.16 In addition, we find that non-GAAP earnings are less conservative 
for both profitable and loss firms, but less timely for profitable firms only. The results 
reinforce the stewardship role of accounting earnings inherent within GAAP, and that 
voluntarily disclosed non-GAAP earnings reflect information users’ demand for 
forecasting and valuation irrespective of the signs of economic signals (positive or 
negative) conveyed by reported earnings. 
 
[Table 8 about here] 
 
Finally, we also investigate the extent to which differences in attributes of non-GAAP 
and GAAP earnings differ according to board independence. Boards with more 
independent directors are expected to be better monitors of the financial reporting 
system within a firm and constrain self-serving disclosure of non-GAAP earnings. 
Frankel et al. (2011) show that the persistence of non-GAAP earnings is positively 
associated with a measure of board independence. We therefore examine the extent to 
which the results reported in Table 3 vary according to whether board independence 
(measured as the percentage of outside directors) is above or below the median. Our 
results, reported in Table 9, suggest that the differences we document between GAAP 
and non-GAAP earnings are not restricted to firms with more independent boards. 
Much the same pattern of increased value relevance and predictability, but less 
conditional conservatism for non-GAAP earnings is evident for firms with both 
relatively more and relatively less independent boards.  
 
[Table 9 about here] 
 
5.2 Robustness analysis  
We consider the robustness of our results to three additional concerns. These are the 
                                                        
16 Our results in this respect differ from those reported by Leung and Veenman (2018) for US firms. 
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switch from Australian-sourced accounting standards to IFRS standards, the 
introduction of regulatory guidance for voluntary non-GAAP earnings disclosures, 
and the effect of initiating or ceasing non-GAAP disclosure. We briefly discuss each 
of these in turn.17 
 
Coulton et al. (2016) provide descriptive evidence of non-GAAP earnings disclosures 
increasing after the mandatory introduction of IFRS for Australian firms (i.e., after 
2005). We therefore examine whether differences in attributes between GAAP and 
non-GAAP earnings measures differ systematically between financial years where 
IFRS is the basis of Australian GAAP, and those preceding that change. The results 
suggest that the differences we document between GAAP and non-GAAP earnings 
occur both before and after the mandatory introduction of IFRS, although in some 
cases they are more evident in the periods after the adoption of IFRS.  
 
In addition to the changes to Australian GAAP following the mandatory introduction 
of IFRS, any differences between GAAP and non-GAAP earnings might also be 
influenced by regulatory intervention (Kolev 2008). However, the only intervention of 
note during our test period was the release by ASIC of Regulatory Guide 230 in 2011, 
and we have noted that the main purpose of this release appears to have been to 
encourage adequate reconciliation between non-GAAP and GAAP measures, rather 
than providing guidelines as to the determination of non-GAAP earnings. 
Nevertheless, we check whether our primary results are impacted by the release of 
ASIC RG 230. Our results show that the release of RG 230 had very little effect on 
the difference between GAAP and non-GAAP earnings. 
 
Finally, we carefully assess whether our main results may be attributable to 
companies who initiate and provide non-GAAP earnings information beyond the year 
of the initial disclosure, and companies who stop the provision of non-GAAP earnings 
after such voluntary disclosure in the previous three years. We repeat our analysis in 
                                                        
17 For brevity we do not include detailed results. These are available from the authors on request. 
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Table 3, but with the added inclusion of two indicator variables, Initiate and 
Terminate, along with their interaction terms. Initiate is an indicator equal to one if 
the firm-year is one where disclosure of non-GAAP earnings commenced, and zero 
otherwise. Terminate equals one if a firm discloses non-GAAP earnings in year t, but 
terminates this form of voluntary disclosure in year t+1, otherwise zero. The results 
suggest that our conclusions are not affected by the initiation or termination of 
non-GAAP disclosures. Non-GAAP earnings are more persistent, predictable and 
value-relevant, but less timely and less conservative, regardless of the temporal 




The voluntary disclosure of non-GAAP earnings has become increasingly common, 
but there is considerable debate as to the underlying motive for these disclosures. The 
voluntary disclosure of earnings measures which do not comply with GAAP has also 
caused significant angst for standard setters (Hoogervorst 2015). Prior research has 
largely failed to help resolve this tension, yielding evidence consistent with both 
informative and self-serving rationales. Our approach contrasts with earlier research. 
Instead of testing either the self-serving or informative disclosure rationales, we use a 
large sample of earnings press releases to directly compare several attributes of 
non-GAAP earnings with their closest GAAP equivalent. This approach has the 
advantage of providing a “controlled” comparison, as the two earnings measures in 
question are reported for the same set of firm-years. Hence, we are able to conduct a 
“horse race” between the two measures, where the “track” can be one of several 
different (and potentially conflicting) earnings attributes. 
 
Using a sample of ASX 500 firms disclosing non-GAAP earnings from 2000-2014, 
we find consistent evidence that non-GAAP earnings are more useful for valuation 
than their GAAP equivalent. Compared to GAAP earnings, non-GAAP measures are 
more persistent, more predictable, smoother and more value-relevant. These are 
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attributes that are likely important if earnings is useful for valuation and/or forecasting 
(i.e., the value relevance role identified by the IASB Conceptual Framework). 
However, improvements in these aspects appear to be at the expense of timeliness and 
conditional conservatism, both of which are argued to be important attributes of 
GAAP that helps fulfil the traditional stewardship role.  
 
We characterize our results as being consistent with a trade-off, whereby the 
overriding purpose of non-GAAP earnings disclosures is to address one role of 
financial reporting (value relevance) which is, to some extent, restricted by 
conditional conservatism inherent in GAAP as well as the way managers and auditors 
have incentives to apply GAAP in a conservative manner. This result is consistent 
with the argument that a single performance measure is unlikely to satisfy the 
requirements of both the value relevance and stewardship roles of accounting (Kothari 
et al. 2010). Our results therefore speak to the extent to which standard setters might 
encourage, or even mandate multiple measures of earnings, possibly via a set of 
subtotals (IASB 2018b).  
 
Our results also support the conclusions of Heflin et al. (2015), who argue that 
security analysts’ focus on “street earnings” in order to undo the effects of 
conditionally conservative GAAP. While much research has focussed on the private 
(or contracting) demand for conservatism, our results support the claim by Barker and 
McGeachin (2015) that, despite the IASB’s apparent rejection of conditional 
conservatism as a desirable attribute of accounting, IFRS standards actually impose 
measurement rules that lead to conditional conservatism. Perhaps ironically, our 
evidence suggests that managers voluntarily provide performance measures to better 
satisfy the valuation role of accounting that the IASB sees as paramount. 
 
Our research also highlights several opportunities for further investigation. Much of 
our analysis is descriptive, while we rely on relatively common methods used to 
capture various dimensions of earnings quality. Alternative methods for capturing 
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these dimensions, as well as entirely different attributes (e.g., earnings comparability 
and information content) are areas that warrant further analysis. We do not 
systematically explore differences between firms that voluntarily disclose non-GAAP 
earnings and those that do not. In addition, we do not consider the extent to which 
firms that do not disclose non-GAAP earnings measures use other forms of voluntary 
disclosure to convey additional information about non-GAAP earnings. The trade-off 
between additional earnings measures versus enhanced disclosure is a topic worthy of 
further investigation. Finally, we do not examine whether voluntarily disclosed 
non-GAAP earnings measures are also used for internal performance evaluation 
purposes (Coulton et al. 2016), something which, prima facie, appears inconsistent 
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Appendix: Variable measurement 
   
Variable  Measurement  
   
Panel A: Earnings variable  
GaapEarn  GaapEarn is GAAP earnings per share, calculated as the 
disclosed corresponding GAAP earnings together with 
non-GAAP earnings collected from a firm’s earnings press 
release divided by the number of total shares outstanding 
NGEarn  NGEarn is non-GAAP earnings per share, calculated as the 
non-GAAP earnings metric collected from earnings press 
release divided by the number of total shares outstanding 
Exclusions  Exclusion is the difference between NGEarn and GaapEarn 
   
Panel B: Firm’s Characteristics 
RET  A firm’s 12 month stock return ending three months after 
fiscal year-end  
NEG  NEG equals to 1 if RET is negative and 0 otherwise 
Price  Price is the closing price at the fiscal year-end 
Bookval  Bookval is the book value of equity per share, calculated as 
total shareholders’ equity divided by the number of total 
shares outstanding 
   
Sizemv  Sizemv is a firm’s size measured by the log of its market 
capitalisation  
Mtb  Mtb is the market to book ratio 
Boardind  Board independence is the percentage of independent 
directors in the board 
Propensity  The industry-level disclosure propensity of non-GAAP 
earnings, measured as the percentage of firms voluntarily 




Table 1: Summary statistics 
Panel A presents the summary statistics of earnings measures and firms characteristics. 
Definitions of all variables can be found in the Appendix. The number of observations is 
11,648. 
 
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev Q1 Q3 
Earnings Variable  
GaapEarn 2,576 0.268 0.136 0.580 0.017 0.345 
NGEarn 2,576 0.323 0.172 0.475 0.066 0.388 
Exclusions 2,576 0.058 0.015 0.260 0.000 0.086 
Firm Characteristics Variable 
Bookval 10,122 1.266 0.453 2.126 0.121 1.404 
Price 10,127 2.692 0.800 5.369 0.200 2.660 
NEG 9,632 0.466 0.000 0.499 0.000 1.000 
Additional Variable       
Sizemv 10,125 18.618 18.536 1.9724 17.238 19.925 
Mtb 10,127 2.808 1.687 3.5203 0.956 3.115 





Panel B presents the frequency of non-GAAP disclosures and the amount of non-GAAP 
exclusions across industries. Definitions of all variables can be found in the Appendix. The 
number of observations is 11,648. 
 







Energy 1,040 19% 0.010 0.004 
Materials (excl. Metals & Mining) 344 49% 0.002 0.003 
Metals & Mining 2,742 10% 0.058 0.008 
Capital Goods 702 34% 0.033 0.007 
Commercial Services & Supplies 538 39% 0.035 0.010 
Transportation 228 28% 0.009 0.002 
Automobile & Components 70 46% -0.041 0.004 
Consumer Durables & Apparel 161 32% 0.037 0.011 
Consumer Services 307 43% 0.015 0.005 
Media 363 49% 0.139 0.004 
Retailing 446 32% 0.060 0.007 
Food & Staples Retailing 87 49% 0.013 0.005 
Food & Drug Retailing 352 35% 0.027 0.004 
Health Care Equipment & Services 454 26% 0.026 0.011 
Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology 505 9% 0.042 0.001 
Banks 24 50% 0.031 0.000 
Diversified Financials 442 39% 0.100 0.003 
Insurance 12 83% 0.001 0.005 
Real Estate excluding Investment 
Trusts 39 51% 0.004 0.000 
Real Estate Investment Trusts 2 50% 0.000 0.000 
Software & Services 617 20% 0.099 0.024 
Technology Hardware & Equipment 158 15% 0.067 0.010 
Telecommunication Services 277 31% 0.098 0.003 
Utilities 204 50% 0.014 0.005 
No Specified  13 8% 1.437 1.437 
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Table 2: Annual regressions: the quality of GAAP vs. Non-GAAP earnings 
This table reports the results of annual regressions that examine the quality of GAAP earnings and non-GAAP 
earnings. Definitions of all variables can be found in the Appendix. The reported coefficients and adjusted 
R-squares are the time-series average from the annual regressions, and p-value in parentheses are calculated based 
on the time-series coefficients and adjusted R-squares. *** (**, *) indicates significant at the 1% (5%, 10%) level 
for two-tailed test. 
 
  GAAP  Non GAAP  Non-GAAP vs GAAP 
  Average Time trend  Average Time trend  Average Time trend 
          
Panel A: Persistence         
Persistence (α1) 0.698*** 0.000  0.937*** 0.005  0.240*** 0.004 
 (0.000) (0.973)  (0.000) (0.706)  (0.001) (0.545) 
         
Panel B: Predictability         
GaapEarn (α1) 0.171*** -0.010  -0.002 -0.009  - - 
 (0.002) (0.402)  (0.953) (0.258)    
NGEarn (α2) 0.788*** 0.015  0.937*** 0.014  - - 
 (0.000) (0.526)  (0.000) (0.309)    
Adj. R2 0.580*** 0.005  0.797*** 0.007  0.215*** 0.002 
 (0.000) (0.686)  (0.000) (0.382)  (0.000) (0.813) 
         
Panel C: Smoothness         
Smoothness - -  - -  1.242*** -0.012** 
       (0.000) (0.029) 
         
Panel D: Relevance         
Bookval (β1) 1.378*** -0.033  0.619*** -0.046  - - 
 (0.000) (0.106)  (0.000) (0.104)    
GaapEarn (β2) 5.707*** 0.049  - -  - - 
 (0.000) (0.683)       
NGEarn (β2) - -  11.677*** 0.059  5.971*** 0.010 
    (0.000) (0.782)  (0.000) (0.948) 
Adj. R2 0.731*** 0.005  0.834*** 0.012***  0.103*** 0.006** 
 (0.000) (0.171)  (0.000) (0.005)  (0.000) (0.040) 
         
Panel E: Timeliness and Conservatism        
NEG (α1)  -0.084** 0.006  -0.044* -0.001  - - 
 (0.034) (0.524)  (0.083) (0.853)    
RET (β1) -0.090*** -0.007  -0.095*** -0.008  - - 
 (0.008) (0.306)  (0.004) (0.240)    
NEG*RET (β2) 0.808*** 0.050*  0.585*** 0.018  -0.223 -0.031** 
 (0.000) (0.070)  (0.000) (0.315)  (0.129) (0.019) 
Adj. R2 0.098*** -0.002  0.066*** -0.005**  -0.031* -0.003* 
 (0.000) (0.406)  (0.000) (0.027)  (0.069) (0.070) 
 
For earnings persistence, we estimate the following regression: 
Earnt+1 = α0 + α1Earnt + υt+1  (1) 
where Earn is GAAP earnings per share (GaapEarn), calculated as the disclosed GAAP earnings together with non-GAAP 
earnings collected from a firm’s earnings press release divided by the number of total shares outstanding for firm i at time t, or 
non-GAAP earnings per share (NGEarn), calculated as the non-GAAP earnings metric collected from earnings press release 
divided by the number of total shares outstanding for firm i at time t; υ is the error term.  
For earnings predictability, we estimate the regression models as follows: 
Earni, t+1= α0,i+ α1,iGaapEarni,t+ α2,iNGEarni,t +εi,t   (2) 
We calculate earnings smoothness as: 
Earnings smoothnessi,t=σ(GaapEarni,t)/σ(NGEarni,t)   (3) 
where Earnings smoothnessi,t is the ratio of firm i’s standard deviation of GAAP earnings over the most recent three years 
divided by beginning total assets, to its standard deviation of non-GAAP earnings divided by beginning total assets. 
Value relevance is estimated using the following models: 
Pricei,t= α0,i+β1Bookvali,t+ β2Earni,t + εi,t   (4)  
where Pricei,t is the fiscal year-end closing price, adjusted for stock splits and stock dividends for firm i at time t; Bookvali,t is 
common equity per share for firm i at time t; and εi,t is the error term. 
With respect to timeliness and conservatism, we use the following models: 
EARNj,t= α0,j+ α1,jNEGj,t+ β1,jRETj,t++ β2,jNEGj,t* RETj,t+ςj,t (5) 
where NEGj,t equal to 1 if RET is negative and 0 otherwise; RETj,t is firm j’s 12-month return ending three months after the end of 
fiscal year t. 
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Table 3: Pooled regressions: the quality of GAAP vs. Non-GAAP earnings 
This table reports the results of pooled time-series and cross-sectional regressions that examine the 
quality of GAAP earnings and non-GAAP earnings. Industry (based on the 25 SIRCA industry 
classification) and year fixed effects are included for all earnings quality measures. Definitions of all 
variables can be found in the Appendix. *** (**, *) indicates significant at the 1% (5%, 10%) level for 
two-tailed test. 
 
  GAAP  Non-GAAP  Non-GAAP vs GAAP 
       
Panel A: Persistence      
Persistence (α1) 0.643***  0.901***  0.258*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
      
Panel B: Predictability      
GaapEarn (α1) 0.124***  -0.005  - 
 (0.000)  (0.791)   
NGEarn (α2 ) 0.803***  0.905***  - 
 (0.000)  (0.000)   
Adj. R2 0.570  0.797  0.227*** 
     (0.000) 
      
Panel C: Smoothness      
Smoothness -  -  1.845 
     (0.207) 
      
Panel D: Relevance      
Bookval (β1) 1.419***  0.698***  - 
 (0.000)  (0.000)   
GaapEarn (β2) 5.248***  -  - 
 (0.000)     
NGEarn (β2) -  10.868***  5.620*** 
   (0.000)  (0.000) 
Adj. R2 0.746  0.839  0.093*** 
     (0.000) 
      
Panel E: Timeliness and Conservatism 
NEG (α1) -0.078**  -0.046  - 
 (0.029)  (0.113)   
RET (β1) -0.104***  -0.100***  - 
 (0.000)  (0.000)   
NEG*RET (β2) 0.832***  0.553***  -0.279*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Adj. R2 0.131  0.117  -0.014*** 
     (0.000) 
 
For earnings persistence, we estimate the following regression: 
Earnt+1 = α0 + α1Earnt + υt+1  (1) 
where Earn is GAAP earnings per share (GaapEarn), calculated as the disclosed GAAP earnings together with non-GAAP 
earnings collected from a firm’s earnings press release divided by the number of total shares outstanding for firm i at time t, or 
non-GAAP earnings per share (NGEarn), calculated as the non-GAAP earnings metric collected from earnings press release 
divided by the number of total shares outstanding for firm i at time t; υ is the error term. For earnings predictability, we estimate 
the regression models as follows: 
Earni, t+1= α0,i+ α1,iGaapEarni,t+ α2,iNGEarni,t +εi,t   (2) 
We calculate earnings smoothness as: 
Earnings smoothnessi,t=σ(GaapEarni,t)/σ(NGEarni,t)   (3) 
where Earnings smoothnessi,t is the ratio of firm i’s standard deviation of GAAP earnings over the most recent three years 
divided by beginning total assets, to its standard deviation of non-GAAP earnings divided by beginning total assets. Value 
relevance is estimated using the following models: 
Pricei,t= α0,i+β1Bookvali,t+ β2Earni,t + εi,t   (4)  
where Pricei,t is the fiscal year-end closing price, adjusted for stock splits and stock dividends for firm i at time t; Bookvali,t is 
common equity per share for firm i at time t; and εi,t is the error term. With respect to timeliness and conservatism, we use the 
following models: 
EARNj,t= α0,j+ α1,jNEGj,t+ β1,jRETj,t++ β2,jNEGj,t* RETj,t+ςj,t (5) 
where NEGj,t equals 1 if RET is negative and 0; RETj,t is firm j’s 12-month return ending 3 months after the end of fiscal year t.
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Table 4: Earnings quality of GAAP earnings for firms with and without 
non-GAAP disclosures 
 
This table reports the results of pooled time-series and cross-sectional regressions that examine the 
quality of GAAP. NG_dummy is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm discloses non-GAAP 
earnings in the year, and zero otherwise. Firm and year fixed effects are included for all earnings 
quality measures. Definitions of all variables can be found in the Appendix. *** (**, *) indicates 
significant at the 1% (5%, 10%) level for two-tailed test. 
  
 GAAP Earnings  
   Persistence (Dependent var. = Net Incomet+1)  
Net Income (α1) 0.814***  
 (0.000)  
NG_dummy (α2) 0.047***  
 (0.000)  
Loss (α3) -0.048***  
 (0.000)  
Net Income × NG_dummy (β1) -0.067***  
 (0.000)  
Net Income × Loss (β2) -0.657***  
 (0.000)  
Net Income × NG_dummy × Loss (β3) 0.364***  
 (0.000)  
Adj. R2 0.814***  
   
Smoothness (Dependent var. = Earnings smoothness)  
Intercept 4.886***  
 (0.000)  
NG_dummy -0.399**  
 (0.018)  
Adj. R2 0.026  
   
Relevance (Dependent var. = Price)  
Bookval (α1) 1.150***  
 (0.000)  
Earn (α2) 6.053***  
 (0.000)  
NG_dummy (α3) 0.096  
 (0.221)  
NG_dummy × Bookval (β1) -0.068*  
 (0.078)  
NG_dummy × Earn (β2) 1.750***  
 (0.000)  
Adj. R2 0.715  
   
Timeliness and Conservatism (Dependent var. = Net Income)  
NEG (α1) -0.027**  
 (0.012)  
RET (α2) -0.024***  
 (0.000)  
NG_dummy (α3) 0.192***  
 (0.000)  
NEG × RET (β1) 0.249***  
 (0.000)  
NEG × NG_dummy (β2) -0.015  
 (0.483)  
RET × NG_dummy (β3) -0.048***  
 (0.002)  
NEG × RET × NG_dummy (β4) 0.375***  
 (0.000)  
Adj. R2 0.191  




For earnings persistence, we estimate the following regression: 
Net Incomet+1 = α0 + α1Net Incomet + α2NG_dummyt + α3Losst + β1Net Incomet * NG_dummyt + β2Net 
Incomet * Losst + β3Net Incomet * NG_dummyt * Losst + υt+1    
where Net Income is GAAP net profit divided by total assets; Loss is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm 
reports a loss in the year, and zero otherwise; υ is the error term. For earnings smoothness, we estimate the 
following regression: 
Earnings smoothnessi,t= α0 + α1NG_dummyt + υt    
Earnings smoothness is the standard deviation of net income before extraordinary items divided by beginning total 
assets, to its standard deviation of cash flows from operation divided by beginning total assets. Value relevance is 
estimated using the following models: 
Pricet= α0+α1Bookval+ α2Earnt + α3NG_dummyt +β1Bookvalt* NG_dummyt + β2Earnt * NG_dummyt + εt  
where Price is the fiscal year-end closing price, adjusted for stock splits and stock dividends; Bookvali,t is common 
equity per share for firm i at time t; Earn is GAAP earnings per share; and εi,t is the error term. With respect to 
timeliness and conservatism, we use the following models: 
EARNt= α0+ α1NEGt+ α2RETt+ α3NG_dummyt + β1NEGt* RETt + β2NEGt* NG_dummyt + β3RETt* 
NG_dummyt + β4RETt* NEGt * NG_dummyt + εt 
where NEGj,t equal to 1 if RET is negative; RETj,t is firm j’s 12-month return ending three months after the end of 
fiscal year t. 
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Table 5: Pooled regressions comparing the quality of GAAP vs. Non-GAAP 
earnings: Small vs. Large firms 
This table reports the results of pooled time-series and cross-sectional regressions that examine the 
quality of GAAP earnings and non-GAAP earnings. Industry (based on the 25 SIRCA industry 
classification) and year fixed effects are included for all earnings quality measures. Definitions of all 
variables can be found in the Appendix. *** (**, *) indicates significant at the 1% (5%, 10%) level for 
two-tailed test. 
 
 GAAP  Non-GAAP  Non-GAAP vs. GAAP 
  Small Large  Small Large  Small Large 
Panel A: Persistence         
Persistence (α1) 0.513*** 0.624***  0.358*** 0.915***  -0.155 0.291*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.577) (0.000) 
         
Panel B: Predictability         
GaapEarn (α1) 0.221*** 0.105***  0.043 -0.000  - - 
 (0.000) (0.005)  (0.279) (0.984)    
NGEarn (α2 ) 0.638*** 0.819***  0.306*** 0.915***  - - 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)    
Adj. R2 0.389 0.557  0.281 0.816  -0.108*** 0.259*** 
       (0.000) (0.000) 
         
Panel C: Smoothness         
Smoothness - -  - -  -0.655 2.771 
       (0.840) (0.111) 
         
Panel D: Relevance         
Bookval (β1) 0.854*** 1.257***  0.748*** 0.522***  - - 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)    
GaapEarn (β2 ) 1.030*** 5.940***  - -  - - 
 (0.000) (0.000)       
NGEarn (β2 ) - -  2.373*** 11.757***  1.343** 5.817*** 
    (0.000) (0.000)  (0.027) (0.000) 
Adj. R2 0.556 0.736  0.584 0.843  0.028 0.107*** 
       (0.126) (0.000) 
         
Panel E: Timeliness and 
Conservatism         
NEG (α1)  -0.021 -0.047  -0.019 -0.020  - - 
 (0.507) (0.392)  (0.336) (0.664)    
RET (β1) -0.042* -0.097*  -0.031** -0.097**  - - 
 (0.067) (0.054)  (0.025) (0.020)    
NEG*RET (β2) 0.442*** 1.094***  0.173*** 0.651***  -0.269*** -0.443*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Adj. R2 0.193 0.132  0.184 0.131  -0.009*** -0.001*** 
       (0.000) (0.000) 
 
For earnings persistence, we estimate the following regression: 
Earnt+1 = α0 + α1Earnt + υt+1  (1) 
where Earn is GAAP earnings per share (GaapEarn), calculated as the disclosed GAAP earnings together with non-GAAP 
earnings collected from a firm’s earnings press release divided by the number of total shares outstanding for firm i at time t, or 
non-GAAP earnings per share (NGEarn), calculated as the non-GAAP earnings metric collected from earnings press release 
divided by the number of total shares outstanding for firm i at time t; υ is the error term. For earnings predictability, we estimate 
the regression models as follows: 
Earni, t+1= α0,i+ α1,iGaapEarni,t+ α2,iNGEarni,t +εi,t   (2) 
We calculate earnings smoothness as: 
Earnings smoothnessi,t=σ(GaapEarni,t)/σ(NGEarni,t)   (3) 
where Earnings smoothnessi,t is the ratio of firm i’s standard deviation of GAAP earnings over the most recent three years 
divided by beginning total assets, to its standard deviation of non-GAAP earnings divided by beginning total assets. Value 
relevance is estimated using the following models: 
Pricei,t= α0,i+β1Bookvali,t+ β2Earni,t + εi,t   (4)  
where Pricei,t is the fiscal year-end closing price, adjusted for stock splits and stock dividends for firm i at time t; Bookvali,t is 
common equity per share for firm i at time t; and εi,t is the error term. For timeliness and conservatism, we use the following 
models: 
EARNj,t= α0,j+ α1,jNEGj,t+ β1,jRETj,t++ β2,jNEGj,t* RETj,t+ςj,t (5) 
where NEGj,t equal to 1 if RET is negative; RETj,t is firm j’s 12-month return ending three months after the end of fiscal year t. 
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Table 6: Pooled regressions comparing the quality of GAAP vs. Non-GAAP 
earnings: High vs. Low market-to-book ratio firms 
This table reports the results of pooled time-series and cross-sectional regressions that examine the 
quality of GAAP earnings and non-GAAP earnings. Industry (based on the 25 SIRCA industry 
classification) and year fixed effects are included for all earnings quality measures. Definitions of all 
variables can be found in the Appendix. *** (**, *) indicates significant at the 1% (5%, 10%) level for 
two-tailed test. 
 
 GAAP  Non-GAAP  Non-GAAP vs. GAAP 
  Low High  Low High  Low High 
          
Panel A: Persistence         
Persistence (α1) 0.506*** 0.711***  0.800*** 0.941***  0.294*** 0.230*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.001) (0.000) 
         
Panel B: Predictability         
GaapEarn (α1) 0.175*** -0.021  0.013 -0.041  - - 
 (0.000) (0.669)  (0.545) (0.176)    
NGEarn (α2 ) 0.666*** 0.957***  0.787*** 0.982***  - - 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)    
Adj. R2 0.412 0.695  0.694 0.852  0.282*** 0.157*** 
       (0.000) (0.000) 
         
Panel C: Smoothness         
Smoothness - -  - -  2.146 1.705 
       (0.414) (0.260) 
         
Panel D: Relevance         
Bookval (β1) 1.319*** 2.005***  0.921*** 1.190***  - - 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)    
GaapEarn (β2 ) 2.189*** 5.032***  - -  - - 
 (0.000) (0.000)       
NGEarn (β2 ) - -  6.414*** 9.675***  4.225*** 4.643*** 
    (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Adj. R2 0.791 0.837  0.844 0.878  0.053*** 0.041*** 
       (0.005) (0.000) 
         
Panel E: Timeliness and 
Conservatism         
NEG (α1)  -0.028 -0.078  -0.011 -0.023  - - 
 (0.538) (0.170)  (0.732) (0.660)    
RET (β1) -0.026 -0.150***  -0.068* -0.134***  - - 
 (0.623) (0.000)  (0.063) (0.000)    
NEG*RET (β2) 0.674*** 0.679***  0.396*** 0.583***  -0.278*** -0.096 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.253) 
Adj. R2 0.143 0.188  0.134 0.198  -0.009*** 0.010*** 
       (0.000) (0.000) 
 
For earnings persistence, we estimate the following regression: 
Earnt+1 = α0 + α1Earnt + υt+1  (1) 
where Earn is GAAP earnings per share (GaapEarn), calculated as the disclosed GAAP earnings together with non-GAAP 
earnings collected from a firm’s earnings press release divided by the number of total shares outstanding for firm i at time t, or 
non-GAAP earnings per share (NGEarn), calculated as the non-GAAP earnings metric collected from earnings press release 
divided by the number of total shares outstanding for firm i at time t; υ is the error term. For earnings predictability, we estimate 
the regression models as follows: 
Earni, t+1= α0,i+ α1,iGaapEarni,t+ α2,iNGEarni,t +εi,t   (2) 
We calculate earnings smoothness as: 
Earnings smoothnessi,t=σ(GaapEarni,t)/σ(NGEarni,t)   (3) 
where Earnings smoothnessi,t is the ratio of firm i’s standard deviation of GAAP earnings over the most recent three years 
divided by beginning total assets, to its standard deviation of non-GAAP earnings divided by beginning total assets. Value 
relevance is estimated using the following models: 
Pricei,t= α0,i+β1Bookvali,t+ β2Earni,t + εi,t   (4)  
where Pricei,t is the fiscal year-end closing price, adjusted for stock splits and stock dividends for firm i at time t; Bookvali,t is 
common equity per share for firm i at time t; and εi,t is the error term. For timeliness and conservatism, we use the following 
models: 
EARNj,t= α0,j+ α1,jNEGj,t+ β1,jRETj,t++ β2,jNEGj,t* RETj,t+ςj,t (5) 
where NEGj,t equal to 1 if RET is negative; RETj,t is firm j’s 12-month return ending three months after the end of fiscal year t. 
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Table 7: Pooled regressions comparing the quality of GAAP vs. Non-GAAP 
earnings: High vs. Low disclosure propensity of non-GAAP earnings 
This table reports the results of pooled time-series and cross-sectional regressions that examine the 
quality of GAAP earnings and non-GAAP earnings. Industry (based on the 25 SIRCA industry 
classification) and year fixed effects are included for all earnings quality measures. Definitions of all 
variables can be found in the Appendix. *** (**, *) indicates significant at the 1% (5%, 10%) level for 
two-tailed test. 
 
 GAAP  Non-GAAP  Non-GAAP vs. GAAP 
  Low High  Low High  Low High 
          
Panel A: Persistence         
Persistence (α1) 0.682*** 0.582***  0.961*** 0.788***  0.279*** 0.206*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.007) 
         
Panel B: Predictability         
GaapEarn (α1) 0.122*** 0.112**  0.038* -0.042  - - 
 (0.003) (0.017)  (0.080) (0.122)    
NGEarn (α2 ) 0.822*** 0.796***  0.924*** 0.834***  - - 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)    
Adj. R2 0.635 0.498  0.857 0.690  0.222*** 0.192*** 
       (0.000) (0.000) 
         
Panel C: Smoothness         
Smoothness - -  - -  3.484 6.736*** 
       (0.517) (0.000) 
         
Panel D: Relevance         
Bookval (β1) 1.529*** 1.285***  0.792*** 0.595***  - - 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)    
GaapEarn (β2 ) 5.706*** 4.556***  - -  - - 
 (0.000) (0.000)       
NGEarn (β2 ) - -  10.690*** 10.997***  4.984*** 6.441*** 
    (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Adj. R2 0.767 0.732  0.846 0.833  0.079*** 0.101*** 
       (0.000) (0.000) 
         
Panel E: Timeliness and 
Conservatism         
NEG (α1)  -0.095* -0.044  -0.060 -0.025  - - 
 (0.062) (0.376)  (0.172) (0.511)    
RET (β1) -0.124*** -0.056  -0.116*** -0.054  - - 
 (0.002) (0.202)  (0.001) (0.107)    
NEG*RET (β2) 0.810*** 0.880***  0.605*** 0.487***  -0.205*** -0.393*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.002) (0.000) 
Adj. R2 0.163 0.153  0.145 0.143  -0.018*** -0.010*** 
       (0.000) (0.000) 
 
For earnings persistence, we estimate the following regression: 
Earnt+1 = α0 + α1Earnt + υt+1  (1) 
where Earn is GAAP earnings per share (GaapEarn), calculated as the disclosed GAAP earnings together with non-GAAP 
earnings collected from a firm’s earnings press release divided by the number of total shares outstanding for firm i at time t, or 
non-GAAP earnings per share (NGEarn), calculated as the non-GAAP earnings metric collected from earnings press release 
divided by the number of total shares outstanding for firm i at time t; υ is the error term. For earnings predictability, we estimate 
the regression models as follows: 
Earni, t+1= α0,i+ α1,iGaapEarni,t+ α2,iNGEarni,t +εi,t   (2) 
We calculate earnings smoothness as: 
Earnings smoothnessi,t=σ(GaapEarni,t)/σ(NGEarni,t)   (3) 
where Earnings smoothnessi,t is the ratio of firm i’s standard deviation of GAAP earnings over the most recent three years 
divided by beginning total assets, to its standard deviation of non-GAAP earnings divided by beginning total assets. Value 
relevance is estimated using the following models: 
Pricei,t= α0,i+β1Bookvali,t+ β2Earni,t + εi,t   (4)  
where Pricei,t is the fiscal year-end closing price, adjusted for stock splits and stock dividends for firm i at time t; Bookvali,t is 
common equity per share for firm i at time t; and εi,t is the error term. For timeliness and conservatism, we use the following 
models: 
EARNj,t= α0,j+ α1,jNEGj,t+ β1,jRETj,t++ β2,jNEGj,t* RETj,t+ςj,t (5) 
where NEGj,t equal to 1 if RET is negative; RETj,t is firm j’s 12-month return ending three months after the end of fiscal year t. 
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Table 8: Pooled regressions comparing the quality of GAAP vs. Non-GAAP 
earnings: Profitable vs. loss firms 
This table reports the results of pooled time-series and cross-sectional regressions that examine the 
quality of GAAP earnings and non-GAAP earnings. Industry (based on the 25 SIRCA industry 
classification) and year fixed effects are included for all earnings quality measures. Definitions of all 
variables can be found in the Appendix. *** (**, *) indicates significant at the 1% (5%, 10%) level for 
two-tailed test. 
 GAAP  Non-GAAP  Non-GAAP vs. GAAP 
  Profit Loss  Profit Loss  Profit Loss 
          
Panel A: Persistence         
Persistence (α1) 0.639*** 0.383***  0.914*** 0.375***  0.275*** -0.008 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.002)  (0.000) (0.957) 
         
Panel B: Predictability         
GaapEarn (α1) 0.075** 0.362***  -0.032* 0.153**  - - 
 (0.021) (0.000)  (0.060) (0.036)    
NGEarn (α2 ) 0.857*** 0.115  0.946*** 0.292**  - - 
 (0.000) (0.444)  (0.000) (0.020)    
Adj. R2 0.577 0.364  0.830 0.444  0.253*** 0.080 
       (0.000) (0.221) 
         
Panel C: Smoothness         
Smoothness - -  - -  2.005 -0.229 
       (0.183) (0.957) 
         
Panel D: Relevance         
Bookval (β1) 1.385*** 0.923***  0.687*** 0.759***  - - 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)    
GaapEarn (β2 ) 5.589*** 1.228***  - -  - - 
 (0.000) (0.000)       
NGEarn (β2 ) - -  11.119*** 2.698***  5.530*** 1.461* 
    (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.089) 
Adj. R2 0.749 0.569  0.844 0.564  0.095*** -0.005 
       (0.005) (0.787) 
         
Panel E: Timeliness and 
Conservatism         
NEG (α1)  -0.043 0.022  -0.020 0.007  - - 
 (0.278) (0.762)  (0.547) (0.852)    
RET (β1) -0.094** -0.025  -0.092*** -0.022  - - 
 (0.011) (0.486)  (0.003) (0.239)    
NEG*RET (β2) 0.860*** 0.440***  0.509*** 0.198***  -0.351*** -0.242* 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.051) 
Adj. R2 0.133 0.214  0.128 0.241  -0.005*** 0.027*** 
       (0.000) (0.000) 
 
For earnings persistence, we estimate the following regression: 
Earnt+1 = α0 + α1Earnt + υt+1  (1) 
where Earn is GAAP earnings per share (GaapEarn), calculated as the disclosed GAAP earnings together with non-GAAP 
earnings collected from a firm’s earnings press release divided by the number of total shares outstanding for firm i at time t, or 
non-GAAP earnings per share (NGEarn), calculated as the non-GAAP earnings metric collected from earnings press release 
divided by the number of total shares outstanding for firm i at time t; υ is the error term. For earnings predictability, we estimate 
the regression models as follows: 
Earni, t+1= α0,i+ α1,iGaapEarni,t+ α2,iNGEarni,t +εi,t   (2) 
We calculate earnings smoothness as: 
Earnings smoothnessi,t=σ(GaapEarni,t)/σ(NGEarni,t)   (3) 
where Earnings smoothnessi,t is the ratio of firm i’s standard deviation of GAAP earnings over the most recent three years 
divided by beginning total assets, to its standard deviation of non-GAAP earnings divided by beginning total assets. Value 
relevance is estimated using the following models: 
Pricei,t= α0,i+β1Bookvali,t+ β2Earni,t + εi,t   (4)  
where Pricei,t is the fiscal year-end closing price, adjusted for stock splits and stock dividends for firm i at time t; Bookvali,t is 
common equity per share for firm i at time t; and εi,t is the error term. With respect to timeliness and conservatism, we use the 
following models: 
EARNj,t= α0,j+ α1,jNEGj,t+ β1,jRETj,t++ β2,jNEGj,t* RETj,t+ςj,t (5) 
where NEGj,t equal to 1 if RET is negative; RETj,t is firm j’s 12-month return ending three months after the end of fiscal year t. 
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Table 9: Pooled regressions comparing the quality of GAAP vs. Non-GAAP 
earnings: High versus low board independence 
This table reports the results of pooled time-series and cross-sectional regressions that examine the 
quality of GAAP earnings and non-GAAP earnings. Industry (based on the 25 SIRCA industry 
classification) and year fixed effects are included for all earnings quality measures. Definitions of all 
variables can be found in the Appendix. *** (**, *) indicates significant at the 1% (5%, 10%) level for 
two-tailed test. 
 
 GAAP  Non-GAAP  Non-GAAP vs. GAAP 
  Low High  Low High  Low High 
          
Panel A: Persistence         
Persistence (α1) 0.590*** 0.633***  0.789*** 0.929***  0.199* 0.296*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.080) (0.000) 
         
Panel B: Predictability         
GaapEarn (α1) 0.154*** 0.104***  -0.003 -0.025  - - 
 (0.006) (0.006)  (0.937) (0.195)    
NGEarn (α2 ) 0.799*** 0.789***  0.791*** 0.956***  - - 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)    
Adj. R2 0.506 0.618  0.646 0.855  0.140*** 0.237*** 
       (0.000) (0.000) 
         
Panel C: Smoothness         
Smoothness - -  - -  5.232* 5.848*** 
       (0.051) (0.000) 
         
Panel D: Relevance         
Bookval (β1) 1.594*** 1.354***  0.843*** 0.646***  - - 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)    
GaapEarn (β2 ) 3.927*** 5.767***  - -  - - 
 (0.000) (0.000)       
NGEarn (β2 ) - -  9.383*** 11.390***  5.456*** 5.623*** 
    (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Adj. R2 0.682 0.772  0.782 0.859  0.100*** 0.087*** 
       (0.001) (0.000) 
         
Panel E: Timeliness and 
Conservatism         
NEG (α1)  -0.072 -0.054  -0.037 -0.034  - - 
 (0.194) (0.229)  (0.408) (0.368)    
RET (β1) -0.043 -0.117***  -0.067* -0.100***  - - 
 (0.322) (0.002)  (0.057) (0.002)    
NEG*RET (β2) 0.523*** 0.947***  0.454*** 0.554***  -0.069 -0.393*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.400) (0.000) 
Adj. R2 0.152 0.178  0.159 0.158  0.007*** -0.020*** 
       (0.000) (0.000) 
 
For earnings persistence, we estimate the following regression: 
Earnt+1 = α0 + α1Earnt + υt+1  (1) 
where Earn is GAAP earnings per share (GaapEarn), calculated as the disclosed GAAP earnings together with non-GAAP 
earnings collected from a firm’s earnings press release divided by the number of total shares outstanding for firm i at time t, or 
non-GAAP earnings per share (NGEarn), calculated as the non-GAAP earnings metric collected from earnings press release 
divided by the number of total shares outstanding for firm i at time t; υ is the error term. For earnings predictability, we estimate 
the regression models as follows: 
Earni, t+1= α0,i+ α1,iGaapEarni,t+ α2,iNGEarni,t +εi,t   (2) 
We calculate earnings smoothness as: 
Earnings smoothnessi,t=σ(GaapEarni,t)/σ(NGEarni,t)   (3) 
where Earnings smoothnessi,t is the ratio of firm i’s standard deviation of GAAP earnings over the most recent three years 
divided by beginning total assets, to its standard deviation of non-GAAP earnings divided by beginning total assets. Value 
relevance is estimated using the following models: 
Pricei,t= α0,i+β1Bookvali,t+ β2Earni,t + εi,t   (4)  
where Pricei,t is the fiscal year-end closing price, adjusted for stock splits and stock dividends for firm i at time t; Bookvali,t is 
common equity per share for firm i at time t; and εi,t is the error term. With respect to timeliness and conservatism, we use the 
following models: 
EARNj,t= α0,j+ α1,jNEGj,t+ β1,jRETj,t++ β2,jNEGj,t* RETj,t+ςj,t (5) 
where NEGj,t equal to 1 if RET is negative; RETj,t is firm j’s 12-month return ending three months after the end of fiscal year t.
 
